Safety culture and resilience engineering exploring theory and application in improving gold mining safety by Pillay, Manikam et al.
 
This is the accepted version of Safety culture and resilience 
engineering exploring theory and application in improving gold mining 
safety. 
Paper presented at Gravity gold 2010 ‘Optimising recovery’ held at 
Ballarat, 21-22 September. 
 
  Copyright The authors, 2010 
COPYRIGHT NOTICE                  
 
 
 
UB ResearchOnline 
http://researchonline.ballarat.edu.au 
 
 
 
1 
 
Gravity Gold 2010 
Safety Culture and Resilience Engineering: Theory and 
Application in Improving Gold Mining Safety 
M Pillay, D Borys, D Else and M Tuck 
 
Contact Author: 
Manikam Pillay 
PhD Student 
School of Science and Engineering, Victorian Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, University of 
Ballarat 
Mt. Helen Campus, Ballarat, Victoria, Australia 
03 5327 9346 
manikampillay@students.ballarat.edu.au 
3 
 
ABSTRACT  
Contemporary approaches to safety management appear to be failing short of meeting its 
mark in improving mine safety. This is evidenced by the high workers compensation, high 
incidence rates and fatalities. Evidence from high-risk and complex organisations points 
towards safety culture as being important in improving site safety. In more recent years 
resilience engineering has been touted as a new and innovative way of managing safety. 
This paper reviews and synthesizes previous literature on safety culture and resilience 
engineering. It then highlights methods that can be used to measure safety culture and 
resilience engineering, and explores similarities and differences between complex 
organisations and gold mining to identify opportunities for more innovative approaches to 
improving safety in gold mining operations through safety culture and resilience 
engineering. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
It is beyond any dispute that the resources sector is important to the Australian economy, and indeed to 
many resource-rich countries. The employment and economic data tells us so. Equally beyond dispute is the 
fact that mining is one of the most hazardous industries in the world. The data on workers compensation and 
work-related injuries tells us so. In Australian for example, the industry employed 1% of workforce in 2007-
2008, but had a workers compensation claim rate of 2% of all serious claims, which equates to around 7 
employees staying away from work due to a work-related disease or injury everyday (Australian Safety and 
Compensation Council (ASCC), 2010). Figure 1 illustrates incidence rate trends in Australia from 1999 to 
2008. 
 
 
Figure 1: Trends in Mine Safety Performance 1999-2008  
(Source: National Occupational Safety Indicators, ASCC) 
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The graph shows that incidence rate has been gradually falling over the nine years. Whilst these reductions 
are welcome, the fact that the incidence rate remains very high at 18 per 1000 employees in 2007-2008 
makes it the second most dangerous industries after construction (Australian Safety and Compensation 
Council (ASCC), 2010). What makes it “even more disappointing is that, despite the plethora of different 
initiatives and campaigns [in different countries] we don’t seem to be able to overcome the problem that 
almost all [of the deaths and] major injuries in our industry are foreseeable and preventable. More often that 
not people are being killed and injured in the same old ways” (Ash and Betts, 2003).  These are telling signs 
that contemporary approaches for improving mining safety are failing to meet its mark, and new approaches 
are required. 
Since the 1980’s safety culture has been advocated as a better approach to safety management, 
and in more recent years resilience engineering has been introduced as an innovation in safety 
management. It is perhaps timely to revisit these approaches to see what opportunities it provides for 
improving safety in the mine industry. The approach taken in this paper is chart the landscape of safety 
culture and resilience engineering by positioning them as different eras safety management. It then explores 
how these notions have been defined and measured. Similarities between complex organisations and mining 
are briefly considered, and a proposition presented on how these measures may be used to improve mining 
safety. 
EVOLUTION OF SAFETY CULTURE AND RESILIENCE ENGINEERING 
Safety culture and resilience engineering can be suggested to have evolved over five different ages of 
safety. The first, from the nineteenth century to the end of World War II, is commonly identified as the 
technical age (Hale and Glendon, 1987), the second, between the two World Wars to the 1970s as the 
human errors age (Coquelle, Cura and Fourest, 1995), and the third, between the 1970’s to the 1980’s 
represented the socio-technical age (Gordon et al., 1996). Accident prevention and safety management in 
these ages were based on contemporary approaches involving technical and mechanical faults, reducing 
human errors and adoption of safe behaviours, and ergonomic design of equipment and work activities. The 
fourth included the cultural age (Gordon et al., 1996), which can be regarded as an advanced way of 
managing safety. More recently Borys, Else and Leggett (2009) suggest we may be in an adaptive age, and 
resilience engineering which is a more sophisticated way of managing safety can be linked with this age. 
Figure 2 illustrates these five ages. 
Other researchers have presented these developments differently. Hale & Hovden (1998), for 
example, suggest the second was about behavioural and human factors, while the third represented 
management and culture. However, Wilpert (2000) supports Gordon at al. (1996) in separating culture as the 
fourth age of safety. Hudson (2007), presents these developments as ‘waves’, associating the first with 
technology, the second with systems and the third with culture. Another variation to the second and third 
ages has been suggested by Le Coze & Dupre (2008), who contend that “following technology, technological 
engineering efforts and implementation of safety management systems, the next improvement should be 
through behavioural interventions” (p. 17). In support of their postulate the authors argue that when all efforts 
have been made to write down and articulate the safety management system, and taking into account the 
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work context, the next logical step was ensuring “disciplined” people followed what was expected from them. 
The authors thus saw safety management systems as the second and behaviours as the third age, making 
no reference to culture.  
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 Figure 2: The Five Ages of Safety 
 
One way in which we can move past these contradictions is perhaps to see these as evolutions across 
different eras of safety, each of which is separated by the prominent views of thinking about safety 
management and prevention of accidents. Citing McCauley et al. (2006), Borys (2009) contends this 
evolution resembled the stage–theory of adult development and leadership- as adults underwent this 
development and evolution they gained a more comprehensive understanding of the world. The important 
thing in this evolution, according to Borys (2009) was that each stage did not leave behind, but built upon 
what was already known. Under this alternative proposition accidents and safety management can be 
suggested to have evolved over five eras. The first era can be identified as the technological era; the second 
as the behavioural and human factors era, the third as the socio-technical era, the fourth as the cultural era, 
and the fifth as the resilience engineering era.  
In the first (technological) era, accidents were largely attributed to mechanical faults. The main 
theories and models important for safety including the dominoes theory (Heinrich, Petersen and Roos, 
1980), where accidents were seen to be caused by a series of five dominoes falling on top of each other. 
The first domino, which initiated the sequence, represented safety (or the management operational losses), 
failures at this level revealed the second domino – basic causes (such as personal and job-related factors), 
which represented operator error. The third domino represented substandard working conditions, that led to 
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an accident (domino four) and personal injury or damage to property (domino five). Safety management was 
predominantly based on the ten axioms of industrial safety (Heinrich et al., 1980). 
The second era represented human factors and behaviours.  The dominoes theory was still used, in 
addition to two related theories of accidents. The first was the human factors theory which attributed 
accidents to human error resulting from overload, inappropriate response and inappropriate activities 
(Heinrich et al., 1980). The accident/incident theory was extended from human factors theory by Petersen, 
who introduced new elements such as ergonomic traps, the decision to err, and systems failures (Heinrich et 
al., 1980). According to this model stressors such as deadlines, peer pressure, and reduced budgets caused 
unsafe behaviour. Accident prevention measures centred on personnel selection, formalised procedures and 
training in behaviour-based safety, attempts largely aimed at fixing the second domino. 
The third era saw an extension of organisations as socio-technical systems in which people 
interacted with other parts (architecture, hardware and processes). This era also marked the realisation that 
humans were rarely the sole cause of accidents or error, and that human performance was based on a 
complex interaction with different components such as individuals, tools, machines and the work 
environment.  Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese model’ became an important way of explaining organisational 
failures and disasters arising from a combination of latent conditions and active human errors during design, 
operations and maintenance (Reason, 1997). A systemised approach was seen to be essential for achieving 
safety in organisations. 
The fourth era recognized the important role played by organisational and cultural factors in shaping 
safe performance. High reliability theory (Roberts, 1989, Rochlin, 1999, Rochlin, La Porte and Roberts, 
1987) and collective mindfulness (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007, Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999) rose 
to prominence as a means of explaining the high safety performance achieved by organisations operating in 
highly hazardous and complex organizations such as nuclear power carriers and air traffic control.  Similarly, 
the role of leadership and safety culture were seen to be important safety drivers in industries such as oil and 
gas, mining, healthcare and railways (Schein, 2004, Hopkins, 2002, Hudson, 2001, Reason, 1998). Safety 
cases and plans were promoted as more advanced ways of managing safety in industries such as railways, 
aviation and chemical manufacturing. 
The fifth era is represented by complexity and uncertainty, with safety and accidents seen as 
complements, and people playing a key role in the proper functioning of modern technological systems 
because of their ability to adapt. The predominant thinking about accidents can be associated with normal 
accident theory (Perrow, 1999, Sagan, 2004). Accident prevention efforts in this age involve organizational 
learning (Schein, 1996, Yanow, 2000)), and learning from complexity (Choularton, 2001). This involves 
learning not only from failures, but also from success as people adapt to create safety through foresight, 
anticipation and action on the changing shape of risks and hazards well before failure and harm occur 
(Woods, 2005, Woods and Hollnagel, 2006). Organisations were seen as complex adaptive systems having 
the ability to adapt and cope under uncertainty and complexity, giving rise to cognitive systems engineering 
(CSE) as a design philosophy concerned with how joint cognitive systems performed in the complex working 
environment (Hollnagel and Woods, 1983, 2005). CSE was further refined to resilience engineering. 
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We can now transform our earlier diagram into these five eras of safety and accident prevention (Figure 3). 
This needs to be replaced with new picture – Eras of safetyfinal.jpg 
 
 
Figure 3: Five Eras of Safety Management 
 
DEFINITIONS AND NOTIONS 
 
Defining Safety Culture 
There is no universal agreement on the definition of safety culture, something that has been noted earlier by 
prominent authors such as Reason (1998) and Guldenmund (2000, 2006). This is evident from Table 1, 
which shows nine related definitions of the concept.  
There, however, appear to be a number of common elements in the definitions. One, it is related to shared 
values of a group. Two, it is concerned with formal safety issues in an organization and is closely related to, 
but not restricted to, management and supervisory teams. Three, it emphasizes the contribution from 
members in the group. Four, it has an impact on the behaviour of members of a group. Five, it is relatively 
enduring, stable and resistant to change.  Borys (2007) and Guldenmund (2000), in summarising the 
definitions, suggest safety culture was a construct which was relatively stable, multi-dimensional, shared by 
groups of people, and comprised of practices that were learned. 
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Table 1  
Common Definitions of Safety Culture 
 
Author(s) and context Propositions and definitions 
Farrington-Darby (2005), 
citing Health and Safety 
Executive (1999) 
Railway 
Nieva & Sorra (2003), 
citing Health and Safety 
Commission (1993) 
Healthcare 
product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment 
to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety 
management. 
Organizations with a positive safety culture are characterized by 
communication founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the 
importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive 
measures. 
 
Minerals Council of 
Australia (1999)  
Mining 
the formal safety issues in the company, dealing with perceptions of 
management, supervision, management systems, and the organization. 
Glendon & Stanton (2000) 
Theoretical 
comprises attitudes, behaviours, norms, values, personal responsibilities as 
well as human resources features such as training and development. 
Guldenmund (2000) 
Theoretical 
refers to those aspects of organizational culture which impact on attitudes 
and behaviour related to increasing or decreasing risk. 
Hale (2000) 
Theoretical 
attitudes, beliefs and perceptions shared by natural groups as defining 
norms and values, which determine how they act and react in relation to 
risks and risk control systems’. 
Pidgeon (2001) 
Theoretical 
the set of assumptions, and their associated practices, which permit beliefs 
about danger and safety to be constructed. 
Richter & Koch(2004) 
Metal manufacturing 
the shared and learned meanings, experiences and interpretations of work 
and safety, expressed partially symbolically, which guide people’s actions 
towards risk, accidents and prevention. 
Biggs et al. (2005) citing 
Cox et al. (1998).  
Construction 
is used to describe the values, norms, attitudes and beliefs that are held 
collectively towards safety within an organization. 
Guldenmund (2006)  
Nuclear,   
citing INSAG (1991) 
assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals 
which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues 
receive the attention warranted by their significance. 
 
Safety culture is subset of an organisation’s broader organisational culture (Haukelid, 2008, Hopkins, 2006, 
Richter and Koch, 2004), which is perhaps easier to understand.  The simplest way of understanding 
organizational culture is “the way we do things around here” (Deal and Kenney, 1982). For Edgar Schein, 
one of the gurus on organizational culture it entails: 
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“…a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems” (Schein, 2004). 
Schein thus sees culture as the result of an organisation’s efforts to concurrently adapt to external 
environments, and to manage its internal integration. His definition includes three layers; an inner (core) 
layer comprised of basic assumptions that are embedded in the organisational system, the middle layer 
comprised of espoused values and attitudes and includes such things as policies, procedures, training, 
accident reports and job descriptions, and the top or outer layer comprised of artefacts, which are most 
visible, and includes things such as management statements, audit reports, accidents and incidents, and 
safety programs and campaigns. 
One shortfall in the above definition, according to Hopkins, (2005), is the omission to behaviours. In 
a later paper Hopkins introduced the notion of organizational safety culture. Every organization, according to 
Hopkins (2006), had a culture (or perhaps a series of subcultures), and this culture could be expected to 
impact on safety in some way. Citing Reason (1997) he posits that safety culture was a constellation of 
reporting, just, learning and being flexible. Hopkins does not provide a definition of organisational safety 
culture, but presents his argument within the framework of an organizational culture. Borys (2007) points out 
that, in addition to behaviours, the definition did not included practices. It may therefore be useful to 
introduce a broader definition of organisational safety culture: 
“Organisational safety culture includes the shared assumptions, attitudes, behavioural 
norms, beliefs and values regarding safety that top level management sets and expresses 
through policies and processes, which is ingrained in perceptions, behaviour and practices 
at all levels, and which develops and improves as an organisation learns”. 
Framed in the above manner the definition covers the essential features of both organizational and 
safety culture, as proposed by Schein, and include those items suggested by Hopkins and Borys. By 
expressing it in the above terms also gives us an ability to break it up into a number of components, for 
example: 
• expectations of management, being assumptions, attitudes, behavioural norms and beliefs; which is 
generally part of an organisation’s vision, mission and objectives 
• policies and processes which can be communicated throughout the organization 
• perception (which can be felt or expressed), and  behaviours and practices (which can be observed). 
The definition also provides pointers to how organisational safety culture could be examined. For example, 
vision, mission and objectives are usually visible as artefacts of an organization, while policies and 
processes form part of an organisation’s management systems. Perceptions can be assessed through 
employee opinion surveys, whilst behaviour and practices can be observed and / or monitored.   
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Defining Resilience Engineering 
In order to understand resilience engineering, we first need to understand resilience. In our view this term 
was first introduced to the safety arena in the late 1980s by Wildavsy (1988), who borrowed the concept from 
ecology. Similar to safety culture there is no common understanding of this term, with at least nine closely 
related, but different definitions apparent from a literature review of some thirty articles (Pillay, Borys and 
Else, 2009). One common element within the identified definitions involves an organization’s ability to 
withstand pressure and continue performing in times of adversity. For example, Westrum sees resilience as 
“the ability to prevent something bad from happening, or the ability to prevent something bad from becoming 
worse, or the ability to recover from something bad once it has happened” (Westrum, 2006). For an 
organisational this represents an ability to bounce back from a catastrophic event without being adversely 
strained. For Hollnagel (2006, Hollnagel, 2009), this recovery occurs at an early stage, or involves the 
continuation of normal works in times of stress. Under these propositions, resilience includes both the ability 
to avoid failure and to respond effectively once these have occurred.  However Wildavsky sees resilience as 
something more; being able to deal with unanticipated dangers (Wildavsky, 1988), consistent with the 
thinking of Woods, for whom resilience involved coping with variations and disturbances falling outside the 
general model of organizations (Woods, 2006). Hence it involves going beyond experiences of the past and 
being prepared for unknown risks, threats and dangers. 
Resilience is a multidimensional set of attributes and abilities, a point that is made by authors such 
as Hamel & Valikangas, (2003) and Lengnick-Hall & Beck (2005, Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2009).  Some of 
the dimensions of resilience include cognition (Bracco et al., 2008, Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005, Lengnick-
Hall and Beck, 2009, Wears, Perry and McFauls, 2006, Weick, Sutcliffe and Obsteld, 2005)), behavioural 
(Epstein, 2008, de Carvalho et al., 2006, Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2009, Mallak, 1998, Wears et al., 2006); 
and contextual (Hollnagel, 2006, Mallak, 1998, Reason, 2001, Wreathall, 2006). These attributes and 
capabilities remain embedded in an organization, acting as a firm “foundation for insight, flexibility and 
hardiness” (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2009) and emerge when situations demand its presence for action. This 
could be during normal, everyday events, or in case of a disaster. 
Cognitive resilience ‘is an organizational capability that assists an organization to notice, interpret, 
analyse, and formulate responses to unfamiliar evolving situations, generating and providing alternatives for 
actions and ‘encouraging decisive actions’ (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2009). Furthermore, it enables an 
organisation to notice shifts, interpret unfamiliar situations, analyse options, and figure out how to respond to 
disruptive, uncertain, surprising conditions that have the potential of jeopardizing the organization’s long-term 
survival (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005, Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2009). Hence it is tantamount to developing 
requisite imagination suggested by Adamski & Westrum (2003), maintaining a state of intelligent wariness 
(Reason, 2008), being pre-occupied with failure (Weick et al, 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), and acquiring 
error wisdom (Reason, 2008). Behavioural resilience includes the “honed and rehearsed actions that 
become part of a firm’s innate reaction to disruptive conditions and is used to drive development of particular 
routines, resource configurations, and interaction patterns that support organizational response” (Lengnick-
Hall and Beck, 2009). These behaviours fashion and exploit flexibility in organizations, and include 
established behaviours and routines that enable an organisation to learn more about a situation, implement 
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new routines, and fully utilise its resources under disruptive, uncertain, surprising conditions that could 
jeopardize the organization’s long-term survival (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2009). The ensuring actions and 
activities enable organizational members to respond collectively to the threats and challenges by means 
which facilitate a stronger and more competent organisation (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2009). Contextual 
resilience includes the network of interactions and resources required to provide the backdrop for the 
organization’s response to disruptive conditions (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2009). It combines interpersonal 
relationships to provide a foundation for rapid responses to emerging conditions, and a network of potential 
resource donors that expand the range of workable options and resource combinations members of the 
organizations can choose from when needed (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2009). 
The absence of a common definition also extends to resilience as evidenced from a literature review 
of thirty articles which showed three different ways in which this notion was described (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 
Common definitions of resilience engineering from a sample of 30 review articles 
 
 
Author(s) and  
context 
Propositions and definitions 
Chialastri & Pozzi 
(2008) 
Research, Aviation 
resilience engineering refers to the broader definition of adaptation, whether the 
system can handle variations that fall outside the design envelop. 
Hollnagel & Woods 
(2006) 
Theoretical 
resilience engineering is concerned with monitoring and managing performance 
at the boundaries of competence under changing demands 
Sheridan (2008) 
Theoretical 
resilience engineering aims at improving a systems capacity to cope with 
unexpected disturbances. 
 
Chialstri & Pozzi (2008) link resilience engineering with adaptation. This is very close to the definition 
proposed by Hollnagel and Woods (2006), for whom it involves monitoring and managing performance at the 
boundaries of competence under changing demands. For Sheridan (2008), it is about improving a systems 
capacity to cope with unexpected disturbances. These definitions describe abilities of an organisation.  
One part of the definition suggests that organizational systems operate near some boundary or 
design envelop. A common metaphor to illustrate this is the drift towards failure model of organizational 
behaviour (Miller and Xiao, 2007, Rasmussen, 1997, Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). According to the model, 
‘the overall operating state of a work system changes dynamically in response to economic pressures that 
push the state away from the economic failure boundary, workload pressures that push the state away from 
the unacceptable workload boundary, and pressures for improved safety that push the state away from the 
boundary of unacceptable performance’ (Miller and Xiao, 2007). The system’s operating state moves 
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dynamically within this given these relative pressures (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005). Failure will occur in 
circumstances where the state of the system is pushed beyond economic, workload, performance 
boundaries (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005, Rasmussen, 1997). In addition to the boundaries of failure, a safe 
operating envelop is also present (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005, Rasmussen, 1997). Close the centre of the 
envelope the risk of failure is minimal, but as organization is pushed first towards and then over a marginal 
boundary the risk of failure increases until failure becomes inevitable (Cook and Rasmussen, 2005, Miller 
and Xiao, 2007, Rasmussen, 1997). This marginal boundary is also dynamic, shifting inwards and outwards 
in response to pressures.   
In their approach Rasmussen and colleagues use a three-boundary model. An adapted version is 
shown in Figure 4, based on four element model of organisations represented by its design (I) architecture 
(ii) equipment and technology, (iii) rules and procedures, and (iv) operator competency. Under the model, 
each of the boundaries represents a point of failure. Resilience engineering involves monitoring how workers 
do their normal work around the perceived boundaries of failure. ‘Becoming aware that the system’s 
operating point is too close to a boundary, or that risks of operating that close are too high, leads to adaptive 
responses, which move the system’s operating point away from that boundary’ (Woods, Schenk and Allen, 
2009). Cognitive resilience is involved in developing this awareness, while behavioural resilience enables the 
adaptive response to be taken. The drift towards failure, according to Dekker (2005) can be associated with 
the ‘normal processes of reconciling differential pressures of efficiency, capacity utilisation and safety against 
a background of uncertain technology and imperfect knowledge.’  
 
Rules and Processes
Equipment and 
TechnologyOperator Competency
Architecture and 
structure
Influences and Pressures Push 
Against the  Boundaries
Margin of error Perceived boundary of 
acceptable performance
Boundary of functionally 
acceptable performance
 
 
Figure 4: Drift to failure model (Adapted from Cook & Rasmussen, 2005) 
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We can now consolidate our understanding to reframe a working definition of resilience engineering: 
“Resilience engineering involves developing and organisation’s behavioural and cognitive 
capability such that it is able to effectively adjust and continue performing optimally near an 
its safe operating envelop in the presence of everyday threats and environmental stressors at 
all levels of the organisation”.  
An important outcome of the above definition is the identification of behavioural and cognitive capability of 
the various levels of an organisation which enable it to run normal operations.  
 
INDICATORS AND MEASURES 
Identifying and Examining Organisational Safety Culture 
The different ways in which safety culture has been defined means there are different indicators and 
measures used in safety culture research, depending on the definitions used, the models employed, the 
industry involved and the specific purpose of the study. For example the Minerals Council of Australia used 8 
elements (organization, management, supervision, management systems, safety systems, job, team and 
individual) (Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), 1999). Pidgeon (2001), in transferring the learning of safety 
culture from major hazard industries to road safety, suggested 4 elements (management commitment, 
individuals attitudes towards violations and procedures, importance of occupational sub-cultures and 
organizational learning from incidents and accidents) were most important. von Thaden et al. (2003) used 5 
elements (organizational commitment, management involvement, reward system, employee empowerment, 
and reporting system) in commercial aviation. In railway maintenance 3 key indicators (management, 
individual and behavioural, and rules and procedures) have been used  by Farrington-Darby, Pickup and 
Wilson, (2005), while Jeffcott, Pidgeon, Weyman and Walls (2006) used flexibility, commitment and learning 
to explore the linkages between risk, trust and safety culture. In a variation, Hart (2006) utilized 6 elements 
(safety values, beliefs and assumptions, leadership and safety, structure of safety, cognitive styles, 
behavioural norms and drivers of safety performance) exploring safety culture in the Australian rail industry. 
In assessing patient safety in the healthcare industry researchers such as Singla, Kitch, Weissman & 
Campbell (2006) have identified at least 6 elements (management/supervision, safety system, risk, work 
pressure, competency and procedures/rules). The validity of these broad indicators has been tested 
empirically and is widely recognised in the different sections of the industry. 
Among the broad methods used to assess safety culture include questionnaire surveys and safety 
audits. Questionnaire surveys are used for gauging employees’ perceptions through employee opinion 
surveys where employees are required to rate organisational factors on a Likert scale. Surveys are relatively 
easy to use in cross-sectional comparisons, generally simple to implement, and straightforward to interpret 
(Creswell, 2009). Another advantage in using surveys is its ability to generate both qualitative and 
quantitative data for comparative analysis.  
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There however, are a number of limitations with surveys. Firstly, it provides a relatively superficial 
description of the culture of an organisation as the researcher and participants only have a brief encounter, 
sometimes none at all if the questionnaire is self-administered. Many organisational practices are too 
complex to be meaningfully described in the words of a survey question (Hopkins, 2006). Secondly, it gives 
us little information about organisational dynamics, the processes it follows when solving problems. Schein 
raises a similar position, noting that members of a culture are most likely to reveal themselves when they 
have problems to solve (Schein, 2004). Hopkins (2006) also contends that the survey method was well 
suited to studying organisational practices and attitudes, suggesting that it may not be suited to studying 
values, something that has also been identified by others such as Guldenmund (2007); who argues that “it 
might very well be that safety value assessment simply requires a different research strategy” (Guldenmund, 
2007).  
Another method of assessing organisational culture involves safety audits, a common method used 
for assessing organisational conformance to management system standards. This is essentially a field based 
activity which involves examining how well an organisation has implemented an agreed set of standards in 
its operations. The usefulness of audits in assessing safety culture was first mooted by Cooper (2000). In his 
proposition of a three factor model of safety culture Cooper surmised that situational (or organisational) 
aspects of safety culture were reflected in organisation’s policies, operating procedures, management 
systems, control systems, communication flows, and workflow systems, as such, these could be measured 
through audits of safety management systems. 
Identifying and Examining Resilience Engineering 
Resilience, as a concept, cannot be measured, until after an impact (Epstein, 2008). As Hollnagel and 
Woods (2006) suggest, “we can only measure the potential for resilience, not resilience itself”. It then holds 
that monitoring for resilience may be a way forward. Dekker (2006) and Woods & Hollnagel (2006), provide a 
starting point: “it is fundamental for resilience engineering to monitor and learn from the gap between work 
as imagined and work as performed” (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006). A key problem however, is that there is no 
accepted approach to how this is to be achieved in reality: ‘the practical problem is how to monitor this gap 
and how to channel what is learnt into organisational practice’ (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006: 336). 
The multidimensional nature of resilience suggests there are a different ways in which resilience can 
be identified and assessed as well. Seville suggests four broad characteristics distinguish resilient firms from 
others: (1) ethos to constantly strive for improved resilience, (2) good situation awareness of the threats and 
vulnerabilities facing the organization through active monitoring of strong and weak signals, (3) a strong 
commitment to proactively identify and manage keystone vulnerabilities, and (4) a culture that promotes 
adaptive capacity, agility and innovation (Seville, 2008). The author suggests 23 behavioural indicators that 
could be used for examining resilience in organisations. Based on their work in high reliability organizations, 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2001, 2007) suggest a set of ten indicators were useful in exploring an organization’s 
commitment to resilience. However, beyond the theory, the indicators suggested by these authors have not 
been empirically tested. Wreathall (2006) identified seven key indicators in order to articulate what the notion 
means to an organisation. These include “commitment by top-level management, just culture, learning 
culture, awareness, preparedness, flexibility and opacity” (Wreathall, 2006). In essence these are also part of 
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an organisation’s safety culture. So examining how these factors permeate across the organisation is one 
way in which the gap between work as imagined and work as performed can be assessed. These can be 
done using both questionnaire surveys and safety auditing by assessing the reality gradient of safety. 
 
The Reality Gradient of Safety 
The reality gradient of safety is essentially a difference between a set of safety factors as seen from the view 
of management and workers (Borys, 2009). For example, an organisation’s policies, standards and 
procedures are one view of how things are expected to occur in the organisation, and this equates to work 
as work as imagined. How these are actually implemented, or seen to be implemented, can be equated with 
work as performed. The difference between the two represents a gradient of reality. If this gradient is small 
there is a high likelihood that the policies, procedures and standards have been well communicated, 
understood and applied uniformly across the organisation. On the other hand a larger gradient suggests that 
there is an ill-match between the two and which needs to be rectified. Figure 5 provides an illustration of a 
reality gradient of safety for management commitment to safety as assessed through the statement “this 
company is very serious about safety”. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Reality Gradients for Management Commitment 
 
 
In the above case the reality gradient for organisation A is larger in comparison to organisation B, suggesting 
a big disjoint between organisational policies and operational practices. A similar response is seen for 
decision-making, as assessed by the statement “If you raise a safety concern, someone follow up very 
quickly” (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Reality Gradient for Decision-Making 
 
APPLICATIONS FOR MINING 
As an indicator, the reality gradient of safety is representative of the gap between work as imagined versus 
work as performed. Because it can be derived through the use of existing tools for assessing organizational 
safety culture, it is our contention that it can be easily applied to the mining industry. From an industrial point 
of view, mining is perhaps a simpler process compared to air traffic control or medical surgery. It includes 
four key steps – excavating, blasting, loading, and hauling. The mineral processing stage adds to the 
complexity of an operation, as does the myriad or legislation the industry needs to be aware of. In respect of 
the job and skill requirements, workers can range from unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled to highly qualified and 
experienced, as such there will a wide variation in the way jobs will be organized and planned. Further 
complexity can be added under fly in – fly out operations, when a substantial number of contractors and sub-
contractors are employed at different points of a mining project. And uncertainties can arise from the 
changing environmental conditions of mining sites. Developing cognitive and behavioural capability in mining 
personnel then becomes necessary so that line managers are equipped and resourced to make the 
necessary sacrificial decisions and operators able to adapt to the changing demands and pressures as part 
of their normal, everyday work. 
A Working Proposition 
A starting point for examining the gap between work as imagined versus work as practiced involves the use 
of the key indicators common to organisational safety culture and resilience engineering. Gaining an idea of 
how wide this gap is will pinpoint areas of concern that need to be addressed. The following six indicators 
are one method by which this can be achieved. 
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Top Management Commitment 
Commitment by top level management involves ‘top management recognizing human performance concerns 
and their attempts at addressing them’ (Wreathall, 2006). This factor proves if human work is valued by the 
management generally. Such a commitment also stresses management making “sacrificing decisions”, i.e. 
knowing when to relax production pressure and efficiency goals and to put safety first (Dekker, 2006). 
Another important indicator for the top-level commitment to safety is if the management encourages people 
to “speak up when they are concerned about safety” (Flin, 2000) and if management “encourages people to 
halt, or slow down production if there are unforeseen safety concerns” In general this could be called 
appreciation of “safety-first-behaviour”.  
Just Culture 
A just culture is the “degree to which the reporting of safety concerns and problems is open and encouraged” 
(Wreathall, 2006). This includes ‘that the boss can hear such [bad] news’, ‘reports of problems are rewarded 
by the management’,  and ‘people are empowered to help intervene, change and improve the organization”’ 
(Dekker, 2007). Such a culture recognizes that ‘honest, unintentional human errors will occur’, (Whittingham, 
2008), work is conducted in a ‘non-punitive environment where disclosure of information will not have a 
negative effect on their career or job prospects’ (Whittingham, 2008), and a ‘confidential reporting system 
exists which not only allows, but encourages employees to disclose their errors, correct their mistakes, and 
raise safety-related concerns without fear of jeopardizing their own career, employment security or being 
disloyal to colleagues or their organization’ (Whittingham, 2008). 
Learning culture 
Learning culture deals with the question if an organization responds “to events with denial versus repair or 
true reform” (Wreathall, 2006, p.280): How does the organization deal with incidents or accidents? Is the 
organization able to rebound under enormous pressure? (Dekker, 2006) Furthermore it is important that the 
organization does not rest on its laurels and that past success is not taken as a guarantee for future success 
(Dekker, 2006). Learning should capture a major significance in the whole organization, “lessons from 
incidents and other events should be handled seriously” and feedback provided throughout the whole 
organization (Dekker, 2006). Another way in which this can be done is by ensuring that discussions 
regarding safety and risks continue to occur even though no accidents are being experienced (Dekker, 
2006).  
Awareness 
Awareness involves knowing “what is going on” in the organization (Wreathall, 2006) and opacity expressed 
the awareness of the system’s boundaries and knowing how close it is to “the edge” of its design envelope 
(Wreathall, 2006). The organization has to gather data of the current state the organization is in and monitor 
it – beliefs about the organization, safety and brittleness have to be updated regularly and have to be 
contrasted with e.g. historical ideals (Dekker, 2006). In particular, the relation between work as imagined and 
work as actually done has to be investigated thoroughly (Dekker, 2006)? Often work drifts away from the 
given procedures without management recognizing that, and management need to continually test whether 
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their ideas about work and risk still match reality (Dekker, 2006). To keep the organisation aware of what is 
going on safety concerns have to be widely distributed throughout the organization (Wreathall, 2006).  
Preparedness 
Preparedness involves the ability to “foresee and avoid” (Westrum, 2006) potential events that could harm 
the organization and its people. This includes being ahead of the problems of human performance, actively 
anticipating threats and preparing for them (Wreathall, 2006). The ability to predict upcoming threats, which 
is important not only for designers but also for front-line operators, involves having a degree ‘requisite 
imagination’ (Adamski and Westrum, 2003). This requisite imagination can be seen as an indicator of 
foresight; that one has to pay particular attention to ‘faint signals’ – an intuitive feeling of something being 
wrong (“gut feeling”) or an intelligent speculation of suspected trends (Westrum, 2006). For this reason it is 
indispensable to take every faint signal and gut feeling very seriously. Executive walkarounds are one way of 
ensuring organisation is well prepared (Hollnagel and Woods, 2006). In some mining companies a similar 
approach called interactions is undertaken. 
Flexibility 
Flexibility is  “the stiffness of the decision-making in the organization, and its failures to respond in a timely 
manner to an increasing need for revising its response to the pressures of production to allow increased 
protection” (Wreathall, 2006). People at the working level sometimes have to make quick decisions where 
they cannot wait for management instructions (Wreathall, 2006). This degree of freedom can also be seen as 
an indicator for the adaptive capacity of the system, i.e. “how well the system adapts and to what range or 
sources of variation” (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006) if it is pushed to the boundaries. Woods & Hollnagel (2006) 
regard this aspect as what resilience is particularly concerned about. Moreover, availability of “slack 
resources”, e.g. material, design-oriented resources or additional times for people to react enables the 
organisation to cope with unforeseen trouble, respond quickly to disturbances and absorb sudden challenges 
when unknown disruptions occur (Wreathhall, 2006). 
 
A Toolkit for Use 
We can now transform these ideas into a toolkit, such as a questionnaire or an audit proforma, which can 
used for examining safety culture and resilience engineering (Table 3). Organisations could choose to use a 
YES/NO response or a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5 as part of a safety climate survey. By collating and 
comparing the results between managers, supervisors and operators assists in working out the reality 
gradient. This can be extended to cover different departments and regions as well. A close examination of 
the responses will pinpoint where improvement actions can be implemented. 
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Table 3 
 
Toolkit for Examining Organisational Safety Culture and Resilience Engineering 
 
Indicator Some Questions To Examine This 
Top 
Management 
Commitment 
 
 
Senior management in this organisation recognise human performance concerns and 
make their best attempts at addressing them. 
Senior management in this organisation make sacrificial decisions in favour of safety 
when faced with production and economic pressures (i.e. they know when to relax 
production pressure and efficiency goals and to put safety first. 
Senior management in this organisation encourage people to speak up when they are 
concerned about safety. 
Senior management in this organisation encourage people to stop or slow down 
production if there are unforeseen safety concerns. 
Just Culture In this organisation, the boss is keen to hear bad news. 
In this organisation, you are (also) rewarded for reporting bad news. 
In this organisation, people are empowered to help intervene, change and improve the 
organisation. 
It is recognised that honest, unintentional human errors will occur. 
In this organisation, disclosure of information does not have a negative effect on my 
career or job prospects. 
A confidential reporting system exists which not only allows but also encourages 
employees to disclose their errors, correct their mistakes, and raise safety-related 
concerns without fear of jeopardizing their own career, employment security or being 
disloyal to colleagues or their organisation. 
 
Learning 
Culture 
This organisation truly learns from failures of the past by implementing true reforms, as 
opposed to responding to such events with denial.  
This organisation is able to rebound when placed under enormous pressure?  
Past success is not taken as a guarantee for future success. 
Lessons from incidents and other events are handled seriously in this organisation. 
Feedback of past incidents and other events is provided throughout the organisation. 
Discussions regarding safety and risk continue to occur even though there are no 
serious incidents. 
Awareness 
 
Safety concerns are widely distributed through the organisation at all levels, so I am 
aware of what is going on in the organisation.  
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While a degree of risk-taking is encouraged, I am aware of the boundaries of safety 
which cannot be crossed. 
The organization routinely gathers data on the current state of the organisation and 
uses it to monitor performance. 
Organisation beliefs about safety and brittleness are updated regularly and contrasted 
with historical ideals. 
 
Work as imagined and work as actually performed is investigated thoroughly. 
 
Management is continually testing whether their ideas about work and risk still matches 
reality. 
Preparedness This organisation takes a proactive role in staying ahead of the problems of human 
performance, actively anticipating threats and preparing for them. 
(Every) faint and/or weak signals and gut feelings are taken very seriously 
Executive management undertake regular walkarounds in the organisation 
Flexibility People at the working are empowered to make quick decisions without wait for 
management instructions. 
There is sufficient slack (in terms of material, design-oriented resources or additional 
times for people to react) in the organisation which enables it to cope with unforeseen 
threats. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
This paper traced the evolution and development of safety culture and resilience engineering as different 
eras and associated these as more advanced and sophisticated strategies for managing safety. A broad 
range of indicators for assessing these are available and which can be distilled into six factors. It has been 
suggested that the reality gradient of safety can be used to explore resilience engineering. Suggestions for 
operationalising and examining these through surveys or audits have been made. Because the mining 
industry continues to be affected by high number of accidents, injuries and fatalities, embracing the 
opportunities afforded by safety culture and resilience engineering may be a step forward improving mining 
safety performance. 
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